The choice among non-callable bonds and make whole, claw back and otherwise ordinary callable bonds

This paper seeks to explain determinates of the choice and the pricing of various types of callable and non-callable bonds. We find that the popularity of different types of callable and non-callable bonds is significantly related to the economic environment. In addition, the popularity of claw back bonds appear to be driven by agency considerations, make whole bonds by the debt overhang problem, ordinary callable bonds by the need by banks to deal with interest rate changes and non-callable bonds by the need to raise funds as cheaply as possible. All else equal, firms pay a higher offer spread for the flexibility to call a claw back bond early via a new share offering whereas issuers of make whole bonds are rewarded with a lower offer spread for restricting calls to circumstances that does not expropriate bondholder wealth

Reaching for Yield and the Diabolic Loop in a Monetary Union

We use the theoretical framework of Acharya and Naqvi (2019) to introduce a macro-financial model where the “reaching for yield” incentivized by a loosening monetary policy in the United States mitigates the diabolic loop in a Monetary Union. We provide empirical evidence that the introduction of an accommodative monetary policy by the Fed lowers the yields in US assets and increases liquidity and, by extension, the threshold above which a liquidity shock can damage a bank. This, in turn, incentivizes bank managers to optimize their portfolios by investing in risky assets. We use a monetary VAR to provide novel empirical evidence that there is an increase in the flow of funds to European assets, a result which can be attributed to the “reaching-for-yield” incentive. This portfolio balance channel attenuates the effects of financial fragility and improves government funding costs as well as credit conditions by providing liquidity to domestic banks and assets. As a result, the “reaching-for-yield” incentive mitigates the diabolic loop effect

Operational research and artificial intelligence methods in banking

Supplementary materials are available online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037722172200337X?via%3Dihub#sec0031 .Copyright © 2022 The Authors. Banking is a popular topic for empirical and methodological research that applies operational research (OR) and artificial intelligence (AI) methods. This article provides a comprehensive and structured bibliographic survey of OR- and AI-based research devoted to the banking industry over the last decade. The article reviews the main topics of this research, including bank efficiency, risk assessment, bank performance, mergers and acquisitions, banking regulation, customer-related studies, and fintech in the banking industry. The survey results provide comprehensive insights into the contributions of OR and AI methods to banking. Finally, we propose several research directions for future studies that include emerging topics and methods based on the survey results

CEO Education and the Ability to Raise Capital

Research Question/Issue: Using a unique hand‐collected dataset, this study examines the role of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) educational attainments in relation to newly public firms. Research Findings/Insights: We find that Initial Public Offering (IPO) firms led by CEOs with superior educational credentials — in terms of level and quality — are associated with lower levels of IPO underpricing. This association is mainly driven by CEOs that hold advanced degrees. Notably, a difference‐in‐difference approach based on two quasi‐natural experiments indicates that the impact of CEO education on IPO underpricing is more pronounced within environments characterized by lower information transparency. The baseline results also hold in the longer term, thereby confirming the value of signaling prestigious academic awards at the time of the IPO. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Using human capital, institutional and upper echelon theories, we hypothesize and demonstrate that CEO educational attainments do not unambiguously affect investors’ perceptions of a firm's future prospects. Instead, their influence depends on the quality of CEO education as well as on the degree of uncertainty regarding the firm's future performance, and the level of information asymmetry between issuers and prospective investors. To our knowledge, this is the first study that provides a comprehensive treatment of the role of CEO education in the IPO context. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our evidence on the importance of CEO education, and especially that CEOs with varying levels and quality of educational training might differentially affect newly listed firms, is useful to providers of financial capital and boards of directors interested in assessing the viability of new ventures. The implication of our study for IPO investors is that it is worth paying more to take an equity position in firms run by better‐educated CEOs

Management earnings forecasts and IPO performance: evidence of a regime change

Companies undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs) in Greece were obliged to include next-year profit forecast in their prospectuses, until the regulation changed in 2001 to voluntary forecasting. Drawing evidence from IPOs issued in the period 1993–2015, this is the first study to investigate the effect of disclosure regime on management earnings forecasts and IPO long-term performance. The findings show mainly positive forecast errors (forecasts are lower than actual earnings) and higher long-term returns during the mandatory period, suggesting that the mandatory disclosure requirement causes issuers to systematically bias profit forecasts downwards as they opt for the safety of accounting conservatism. The mandatory disclosure requirement artificially improves IPO share performance. Overall, our results show that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts can impede capital market efficiency once it goes beyond historical financial information to involve compulsory projections of future performance

CEO Profile and Earnings Quality

This paper introduces the PSCORE, which aggregates nine personal characteristics of chief executive officers (CEOs), to signal the quality of earnings. The PSCORE is a composite score based on publicly available data on CEOs. The study reports strong positive relationships between the PSCORE and two different proxies for earnings quality, (i) discretionary accruals and (ii) financial statement errors, measured by deviations of the first digits of figures reported in financial statements from those expected by Benford’s Law. Further analyses indicate that the relationships between the PSCORE and the proxies for earnings quality become more pronounced when CEOs have high equity-based compensation incentives. The findings have some implications for practitioners

Mandatory vs Voluntary Management Earning Forecasts

Companies making initial public offerings in Greece were obliged to include next year’s profit in the new issue prospectuses, in order to help investors’ value companies and make safe investment decisions, until the regulations changed to voluntary status. This study takes advantage of this regulation alteration and compares the accuracy of earnings forecasts under both mandatory and voluntary disclosure environments. In order to achieve this it uses a large data set of 305 IPOs, which were floated during January 1993 to June 2009 period and employs a number of error metrics to examine forecast accuracy. Findings indicate behavioural change as earnings forecast pessimistic trend during the mandatory era turns to optimistic in the voluntary period. The comparison of those two methods suggests that mandatory earnings forecast regulation may force firms to forecast that have nor the incentives neither the ability to do so. Instead, the results imply that regulations penalizing I